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Abstract
Do childcare institutions affect gender norms of individuals? I examine the introduc-
tion of childcare services and their impact on voters’ support of policies promoting
maternal employment. I address the inherent endogeneity between institutions and
attitudes by exploiting regional variation in the regulations and provision of child-
care for school children outside of regular school hours. My results show that the
expansion of childcare for school children increases voters’ support of policies pro-
moting maternal employment. This indicates a direct effect of local institutions
on voters’ attitudes. I additionally show that as public costs of the new facilities
increase, support of additional policies promoting maternal employment decreases.
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1 Introduction
Life cycle employment patterns of women are largely shaped by children. Kleven et al.
(2019) show that women’s earnings decrease by 30 percent (Denmark) to 80 percent
(Germany) after the birth of the first child and remain 20 percent respectively 60 percent
below their counterfactual income ten years after the birth of their first child. Men’s
incomes, on the other hand, remain largely unaffected by the birth of a child, which
further makes children the most prominent explanation for the persisting gender wage
gap.1
Parental leave and subsidized childcare decrease the costs for women to return into the
workforce after the birth of a child and have been seen as the most important instruments
to reconcile work and family responsibilities.2 New evidence suggests, however, that
the large differences in the impact of children on mothers’ employment across countries
cannot be explained by differences in public policies (Kleven et al., 2019). The striking
correlation between attitudes towards working mothers and women’s decrease in earnings
after the birth of a child suggests gender norms and culture as important factors behind
this pattern. Given the importance of gender norms in fertility and employment decisions,
it is crucial to understand their formation and how they are affected by the institutions
in place.
This paper offers an empirical analysis of whether childcare institutions affect attitudes
towards working mothers. It benefits from a quasi-experimental setting in Switzerland,
which creates discontinuity in regulations and in the actual provision of lunchtime and
after-school care, and thus allows for the application of a differences-in-differences strat-
egy. It also benefits from federal ballots on family policy related topics revealing voters’
preferences.
In 2010, the cantons of Bern and Zurich introduced a new regulation requiring munic-
ipalities to assess the demand for childcare for school children each year and to introduce
lunchtime and after-school care in case of sufficient demand. Using municipalities in neigh-
boring cantons as a control group allows me to apply a differences-in-differences design to
estimate the effect of this new regulation on individuals’ attitudes. The regulation addi-
tionally creates interesting variation within cantons, which allows me to study the effect of
the actual provision of lunchtime and after-school care on individuals’ attitudes towards
working mothers: The regulation clearly states that if ten or more children are signed
up for lunchtime and after-school care, the municipality is obligated to introduce these
facilities. There are thus some municipalities which are required to introduce lunchtime
1Studies on the role of parenthood in explaining gender gaps are e.g. Waldfogel (1998); Correll et al.
(2007); Paull (2008); Bertrand et al. (2010); Goldin (2014); Adda et al. (2017); Angelov et al. (2016);
Kleven et al. (2019); Bütikofer et al. (2018).
2Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) give an excellent overview of family policies across high-income coun-
tries and effects of parental leave and early childhood education and care on female employment rates,
the gender employment gap, gender earnings gap, and fertility rates.
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and after-school care as a consequence of the new regulation, while others are not. I also
exploit this feature for the analysis.
I find that the introduction of lunchtime and after-school care increases support for
policies promoting maternal employment by up to 3 percentage points, with a larger effect
found in municipalities where public costs of the new facilities are low. After controlling
for actual provision, I find a negative effect of the regulation, with support of public
policies promoting maternal employment decreasing by up to 10 percentage points. Since
the total public costs of lunchtime and after-school care are borne by all municipalities
in the cantons with regulation and not only by municipalities with actual provision, this
is in line with the result that the increase in support is larger when costs are lower. As
a robustness test, I draw upon a large number of ballots on healthcare related topics
voted upon in the same time period considered for the main analysis. This allows me to
show that the three groups of municipalities, municipalities in cantons with no regulation,
municipalities in cantons with regulation and no provision, and municipalities in cantons
with regulation and provision, do not generally show diverging trends, thus affirming my
identifying assumptions.
My analysis is inspired by and contributes to a growing literature focusing on attitudes
towards maternal employment as an important explanation for the persisting gender earn-
ings gap. The birth of a child creates a striking divergence in earnings’ paths of men and
women, as documented e.g. by Angelov et al. (2016); Bütikofer et al. (2018); Kleven et al.
(2019). Kleven et al. (2019) show that these differences across countries are strongly
related to attitudes towards working mothers. Childcare and employment decisions of
mothers are met with opinionated societal feedback and are strongly impacted by social
norms. Understanding how social norms are formed is therefore crucial in explaining the
differing effects of children on female earnings.
Culture has been shown to be an important factor in determining gender norms. Using
historical data, Alesina et al. (2013) show that descendants of societies which tradition-
ally practiced plough agriculture have less equal gender norms today. Intergenerational
transmission is another important driver of gender norms (see e.g. Kleven et al. 2019;
Fernandez and Fogli 2009). Another factor are the institutions one is exposed to. Slotwin-
ski and Stutzer (2018) show that the introduction of female suffrage leads to substantial
changes in individuals’ norms and outcomes even in the medium term. Exploiting the
German separation and later reunification, Bauernschuster and Rainer (2012) show that
individuals exposed to East German institutions promoting female employment hold more
equal gender attitudes than West Germans after reunification. Unterhofer and Wrohlich
(2017) study a parental leave reform in Germany in 2007, which introduced the option for
fathers to take part of the parental leave, and its effect on grandparents’ attitudes. They
find that mothers of exposed fathers have significantly more positive attitudes towards
working mothers but find no effect for fathers. Their study shows that there is a short
term effect of institutions on attitudes of individuals in the immediate environment and
in the very short term.
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My paper also focuses on the short term effect of the introduction of childcare in-
stitutions on gender attitudes of individuals. It contributes to the current literature by
considering the effect of institutions on attitudes of the total population, instead of only
focusing on the effect on the immediately exposed group.
This study is related to a paper by Felfe et al. (2016), who also exploit the introduction
of the same regulation and its effect on parents’ employment. However, they only have
cross sectional data on childcare provision and employ an IV strategy using the regulation
I exploit as an instrument. They find that the introduction of lunchtime and after-school
care increases maternal full-time employment, with no effect on fathers and no change in
participation rates. I cannot replicate their empirical design since I have to control for
level differences between the treated and control groups, which they cannot do in their
setting.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. The next section provides informa-
tion on the institutional background serving as a backdrop to this analysis and demon-
strates how vote outcomes are an interesting approach to measuring attitudes. Section 3
contains the main theoretical considerations and the empirical identification strategy. Sec-
tion 4 presents the data, some descriptive statistics, and graphical depiction of preliminary
results. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 discusses the costs of public
institutions as a potential mechanism driving the results and presents some robustness
analyses. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
In Switzerland, life cycle employment patterns differ strongly between genders and are
largely shaped by children. While female labor force participation has steadily been
increasing since 1980 and is now among the highest of OECD countries, women’s weekly
hours are among the lowest and there is a large gap in hours worked between women and
men.
School schedules are not promotive of maternal employment either. The dates and
timetables of public school in Switzerland are set by each of the 26 cantons independently.3
Nevertheless, most schools have core times from around 8.30 a.m. until 11.30 a.m. and
then from 1.30 p.m. until 3 p.m.. Outside of these core hours, there is generally no
responsibility for the schools to offer any supervision. Usually, there is no school on one
or two afternoons per week. Private or public childcare facilities increasingly cover these
hours. The cantons and municipalities share the responsibility for the authorization,
regulation and supervision of formal childcare facilities. The allocation of the different
3Compulsory schooling (classes 1 to 9) and pre-school education (1 to 2 years, approximately ages
4 to 6) are authority of the cantons and municipalities. Cantons can also set curricula independently.
There has been more and more coordination between cantons recently and since 2011, there have been
national educational objectives which cantons are required to achieve. Compulsory schooling and pre-
school education are financed by the municipalities and cantons through municipal and cantonal taxes.
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tasks among the two government levels varies from canton to canton. However, the cantons
generally have more authority.
If a school provides lunchtime and after-school care, this generally means that, for a
fee, children can stay at school before school, during the lunch break, and in the afternoon.
The school serves breakfast, lunch, and a small snack in the afternoon and there are a
distinct number of caretakers, usually one caretaker per ten children, certified by the
cantonal school authority. Facilities must also be such that there is sufficient room for
pupils to do their homework, rest, and play.
In 2010, the cantons of Bern and Zurich introduced a new regulation obliging munic-
ipalities to assess the demand for childcare needs of school children’s parents regularly.
If ten or more children are signed up for any time slot,4 the municipality must provide
this service. I exploit this change in regulation for the empirical analysis. The cantons
of Basel City, Graubuenden, Lucerne, Neuchâtel, and Schaffhausen have since introduced
similar regulations. All other cantons did not have any similar regulation as of 2016.
A federal impulse program implemented to create more childcare places helped munic-
ipalities cope with the large initial costs of the regulation. The program was introduced
in 2003 with the goal of expanding childcare facilities, which would in turn help parents
reconcile work and family life. Subsidies are awarded to new facilities or to facilities
expanding their supply substantially. The funding covers initial fixed costs, which helps
facilities cope with low initial capacity utilization. Financial assistance is awarded to both
private and public facilities which fulfill quality requirements and which can show that
there is demand for additional facilities. From its introduction until the year 2016, the
program financed 1,223 childcare facilities for school children.5
Costs of childcare are borne by parents with some municipalities or cantons granting
subsidies either to childcare facilities directly or to parents. In both, Bern and Zurich,
parental costs depend on parents’ income. In Bern, municipalities are refunded by the
canton for total labor costs minus parental contributions. Costs after redistribution and
parental contributions are borne by the municipalities. Ceteris paribus, an increase in
taxes in the cantons introducing new childcare facilities is expected.
In Switzerland, income taxes are raised by the municipalities, the cantons, and the
federal government. Cantons are free to set the tax schedule, whereas municipality taxes
correspond to a multiple of the cantonal taxes. Municipality taxes thus have no impact
on the redistribution across incomes within a canton.
Approximately four times a year, Swiss citizens over the age of 18 have the right to
vote. There are typically a number of bills which are voted upon on the same day. Voters
4One slot refers to the time slot before school, at lunchtime, or in the afternoon. If a school offers care
for all time slots, this would be three times a day, five times a week, i.e., there is a maximum of 15 slots
per week.
5More information can be found on the homepage of the Federal Social Insurance Office. The law came
into force on 1 February 2003 and has been extended multiple times until 2019, and till 31 December
2015, 300 million CHF was awarded. It is called “Federal Law on Financial Support for Childcare”
(“Bundesgesetz über Finanzhilfen für familienergänzende Kinderbetreuung”).
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receive an envelope containing the ballot as well as a small booklet with information on
the topics voted upon approximately one month prior to the voting date. Voters can
either choose to return the ballot in the anonymized envelope prior to the vote date or
cast their vote directly in polling booths. Some cantons have introduced the option to
vote electronically, an option which is also available for Swiss citizens living abroad. The
topics voted upon most frequently include healthcare, taxes, welfare, drug policy, public
transport, immigration, asylum, and education (Cormon, 2014).
There are three types of votes: initiatives, legislative referendums, and constitutional
referendums. Initiatives allow Swiss citizens to propose constitutional amendments and
new laws. For an initiative to come to a vote, a total of 100,000 valid signatures, which
amounts to approximately 2% of the Swiss electorate, must be collected by the initia-
tors. Referendums allow the electorate to challenge laws approved by the parliament. For
these legislative referendums, 50,000 valid signatures must be collected by the opposi-
tion. In case of constitutional amendments proposed by the parliament, federal votes are
mandatory and are called constitutional referendums. Constitutional referendums and
initiatives proposing a constitutional change require that in addition to the majority of
voters, a majority of cantons must approve.6 All other referendums and initiatives only
require a share of yes votes of 50 percent or higher in order to be passed. For a more
detailed description of the Swiss system, see e.g. Linder (2010).
2.1 Measuring Attitudes towards Maternal Employment
I propose vote outcomes of different national ballots on family policy as a measure for
individuals’ attitudes towards maternal employment. Vote outcomes as a measure of
social norms have been used, e.g., by Stutzer and Lalive (2004) or Slotwinski and Stutzer
(2019). I exploit four ballots on family policy taking place in Switzerland from 1999
to 2013. The first two ballots are related to maternity leave, the third ballot is on the
expansion of childcare, while the fourth ballot is concerning tax deductions for families.
Maternity leave policies have long been part of the political discourse in Switzerland.
In 1945, a maternity protection period of eight weeks after the birth of a child was
introduced. During this time, mothers were not allowed to work and their employment
contract could not be terminated. After that, there were several attempts to introduce
paid maternity leave. The first ballot considered in this study took place in 1999 and
was the fourth attempt to introduce paid maternity leave. The bill proposed 14 weeks of
paid maternity leave for all mothers, paid through the value added tax, and was rejected
by 61 percent of voters. The 2004 bill proposed 14 weeks of paid maternity leave with
an income replacement of 80 percent only for mothers who were employed prior to giving
6More accurately, 20 out of the 26 cantons have one vote each, the other 6, the so-called half cantons,
have half a vote each (the half cantons are Basel-City, Basel-Country, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Appenzell-
Innerrhoden, and Appenzell-Ausserrhoden). A majority of 12 votes is therefore sufficient to reach the
cantonal majority. A canton’s vote is determined by the popular vote of the canton’s population. If a
majority of the canton’s population votes in favor, the whole cantonal vote is regarded as in favor of the
proposed bill.
5
birth, paid for through employers’ and employees’ social insurance contributions, and was
approved by 56 percent of voters. The next national ballot on family policy took place
in 2013. The bill proposed a constitutional change where cantons and municipalities are
obligated to regularly assess demand for childcare institutions and provide an adequate
supply of such. If cantons were not to fulfill this requirement, the federal government
could intervene. This would imply a reform compared to the status quo, with the whole
responsibility lying at the cantonal level. The bill was supported by a majority of voters
(54 percent) but only 11 of the 26 cantons had a majority and hence, this constitutional
change was not implemented. The last bill I consider is an initiative voted upon in
November 2013. Families can deduct part of the costs of formal childcare from their
taxable income. The initiative proposed the same deduction to be attributed to families
where one parent stays home to take care of the children. 42 percent of the population
voted in favor of this amendment. Figure 1 shows the results of the four votes at the
municipality level.7
Figure 1 shows that approval rates are generally highest in the French speaking part
of Switzerland (i.e., the cantons in the west) and in the Ticino, the southernmost and
only exclusively Italian speaking canton of Switzerland. Support for the welfare state is
generally higher in the French speaking part of Switzerland and provision of childcare
has also traditionally been much higher in the French speaking part than in the German
speaking part.8 The same is true for the Ticino: The school system has long been such
that it allows for the accommodation of work and family responsibilities.
In the empirical analysis, I use vote outcomes as a proxy for voters’ revealed attitudes
towards maternal employment. I argue that individuals who support maternal employ-
ment will in general be more likely to vote in favor of any institutions facilitating the
compatibility of employment and family responsibilities and vote against promotion of
the traditional family model.9 Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that in the
first three ballots, individuals who are in favor of maternal employment will vote yes.
However, when it comes to the 2013 bill, I argue that voters supporting the traditional
family model will vote yes. In order to compare the results of the four ballots, going
forward I will consider the share of no votes for this last ballot.
7Data on approval rates are publicly available from the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office and for all federal ballots since 1981
(https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/politik/abstimmungen.html). De-
tailed information on all ballots is available from the Swiss Federal Chancellery
(https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/dokumentation/abstimmungsbuechlein.html). The infor-
mation is available in German, French, and Italian.
8Steinhauer (2018) exploits the border between the German and French speaking parts of Switzerland
to examine how attitudes towards working mothers are related to employment and fertility decisions of
women. He finds that German-born women are 15 to 25 percent less likely to work as mothers, and 20
to 25 percent more likely to remain childless by the age of 50 compared to women born in the French
speaking part, a difference which is attributed to the difference in attitudes towards working mothers.
9Table A.3 in Appendix A.2 shows that based on individual level data, individuals’ party affinity,
which proxies their attitudes, is a strong predictor of whether they vote yes or no and the predictive
power is similar across the four ballots.
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Figure 1: The graphs show average approval rates for each municipality in Switzerland and
for the four bills on policies promoting maternal employment considered in this analysis. White
lines mark municipality borders; black lines mark cantonal borders. Light blue areas indicate
low approval rates and dark blue areas indicate high approval rates.
The campaigns leading up to the ballots underline the similarities of the four ballots.
The Swiss People Party, a well-funded populist party and the most prominent when
it comes to policy campaigns in the last two decades, has been fighting bills promoting
maternal employment, suggesting the introduction of the proposed institutions would lead
to unhappy “state children”. Examples of campaign posters can be found in Appendix A.1.
Post vote survey data also offer support that the vote results are a good measure of
voters’ attitudes towards working mothers, with a positive correlation between voters’
attitudes towards maternal employment and the probability that they support a policy
promoting the compatibility of work and family responsibilities.10 As shown in Table A.2
in Appendix A.2, this correlation is robust to the inclusion of additional covariates de-
10The question asked in the survey is whether the voter wants a country which actively promotes
women’s equality or a country where neither women nor men receive preferential treatment. The effect
must therefore be seen as a lower bound for the correlation of the support for maternal employment and
the probability to support a policy targeting this. There are probably many voters who do not want
favorable treatment of women but who still think that policies that allow parents to conciliate work and
family responsibilities more easily are important.
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scribing individual characteristics and, with a probability of voting yes which is 17 to
19 percentage points higher for voters supporting maternal employment, quite sizable.
There is a positive albeit insignificant correlation for the fourth, the family initiative bal-
lot, which may reflect that here, voting for the status quo implied preferences for maternal
employment instead of the other way around.
In addition to measuring revealed instead of stated preferences, using vote outcomes
has the advantage that the whole voting population is considered. In most surveys,
only the population directly exposed to certain institutions is asked about their attitudes
towards related topics. For instance, for the question posed in this paper, it is mostly
parents or close relatives of the directly affected population that are asked about their
attitudes towards childcare (see e.g. Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011; Bauernschuster and
Rainer 2012; Unterhofer andWrohlich 2017). However, one’s own preferences are to a large
extent driven by social norms, which can only be measured when the whole population
is considered. Observing all voters allows me to investigate a policy feedback effect on
the whole population and thus consider the total effect institutions have on individuals’
attitudes.
On the other hand, there are risks to using vote outcomes as a measure of attitudes.
However precise the bill may be, there are always multiple policy areas that may be af-
fected by its implementation. Therefore, there are multiple different reasons why any
individual may vote in favor of or against a certain bill, which range from personal af-
fectedness to a tradeoff between multiple public goods one might not directly benefit
from.
As discussed, there are typically a number of bills voted upon simultaneously. Polling
in Switzerland is usually 40 to 50 percent, and individuals who vote on one bill on any
specific day are more likely to also vote on the other bills. Voter selection is therefore
affected by the entirety of bills voted upon on any specific date, which in turn may
influence vote outcomes. Due to the differences-in-differences setting, however, this is
only a problem if voter selection is affected differentially in the treatment and the control
group.
3 Identification
3.1 Hypotheses
The division of work and family responsibilities within a couple are to a large extent
driven by gender norms and gender roles. Interaction within social groups and imitation
of role models play an important part in the formation of gender roles and norms (Bussey
and Bandura, 1999). Persisting norms affect individuals’ behavior either through their
preferences or as constraints. Deviating from these norms is costly. In their seminal work,
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) conceptualize these considerations by an identity parameter.
Norms are to a large extent shaped by culture and transmitted intergenerationally, as
8
shown by (Alesina et al., 2013; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009; Fernández et al., 2004). Ad-
ditionally, they are shaped and affected by institutions (see, e.g., Bowles 1998). In this
paper, I study whether the introduction of a new institution has a short term effect on
individuals’ norms and attitudes.
In a setting with many small municipalities and where, in many cases, it is not econom-
ically necessary for both parents to have paid work, I argue that social norms concerning
working mothers are very salient, which makes it costly to deviate (Akerlof and Kranton,
2000). I hypothesize that the introduction of lunchtime and after-school care sends the
implicit signal that it is socially acceptable for mothers to be employed, which leads to
a response in individuals’ attitudes already in the short-term. Based on this hypothesis,
I expect municipalities in cantons with regulation concerning lunchtime and after-school
care to experience the following adjustments: First of all, individuals living in municipal-
ities with demand above the threshold of 10 children experience an exogenous shock to
their norms from the introduction of lunchtime and after-school care. This change could
be through direct exposure, where parents benefit directly from lunchtime and after-school
care for their children. Additionally, family, friends, and neighbors will experience second
hand how family life changes through the presence of these institutions. Also, the presence
of the institutions themselves implies that it is socially acceptable for mothers to work,
making it less pricy to express personal preferences in favor of working mothers, which
increases the likelihood to vote in favor of policies promoting maternal employment.
Secondly, the whole population in a canton with regulation concerning lunchtime and
after-school care experiences a tax increase. Even though expenditures for lunchtime
and after-school care constitute only a small part of total cantonal expenditures and the
exact reasons for tax increases are usually not given, I nevertheless expect a negative
effect on attitudes towards additional policies encouraging maternal employment through
the (perceived) tax increase and its effect on the budget constraint. Since most of the
public costs are incurred at the cantonal level, this negative effect is experienced by all
municipalities in a canton with regulation, no matter whether they actually introduce
lunchtime and after-school care or not. I analyze empirically whether the positive effect
in the municipalities actually introducing school care outweighs the negative tax effect. In
addition, there may be an increase in maternal labor supply, which might in turn create
additional tax revenue. I abstract from this effect for simplicity. Graphically, the two
effects discussed above are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2a exemplifies the change in support of policies towards the promotion of ma-
ternal employment in municipalities with provision compared to municipalities with no
provision of lunchtime and after-school care within cantons with regulation (treated can-
tons). Support of policies facilitating maternal employment has generally been increasing
over the last decades. The line treated canton, provisions shows the change in support
in the municipalities which introduce lunchtime and after-school care after the new reg-
ulation is introduced. This change in support consists of both a positive effect from the
public good expansion, as well as a negative effect from the tax increase. Municipalities
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Figure 2: This graph exemplifies the opposing provision and regulation effects. The provision
effect displays the exemplified change in approval rates in the cantons with regulation,
distinguishing between municipalities for which the new regulation becomes binding (due to
demand for lunchtime and after-school care surpassing the 10 kids threshold) and
municipalities for which the new regulation does not become binding. The regulation effect
shows the hypothesized jump in approval rates on family policy related topics in cantons
introducing a new regulation promoting lunchtime and after-school care compared to cantons
without a change in regulation, without controlling for actual provision.
in the treated canton but with demand below the threshold are not obligated to introduce
lunchtime or after-school care and only experience the negative tax effect. The difference
between the two lines displays the aggregate effect on voters’ attitudes, controlling for the
costs of the institutions as these are borne by all municipalities.
Figure 2b compares the aggregate effect of the introduction of the regulation con-
cerning lunchtime and after-school care to the aggregate change in vote outcomes in the
untreated cantons. Again, support of policies promoting maternal employment has gen-
erally increased over time. The control cantons experience no treatment and therefore no
shock in the periods after the new regulation is introduced in the neighboring cantons.
In the treated cantons, municipalities with no introduction and after-school care experi-
ence both a positive effect on attitudes, as well as a negative cost effect. Municipalities
with no provision but which are located in a canton with regulation only experience the
negative cost effect. Controlling for the positive effects on attitudes, the regulation effect
thus shows the effect of the regulation experienced by all municipalities in cantons with
regulation.
3.2 Empirical strategy
In order to identify the causal effect of the availability of school care provisions on voters’
attitudes towards maternal employment, a setting with exogenous variation in childcare
supply is needed. Such a setting is rare since the provision of lunchtime or after-school
care is likely influenced by population preferences. I address this inherent endogeneity
problem by exploiting the introduction of a new regulation in the cantons of Bern and
Zurich, where all municipalities are now required by law to provide lunchtime and after-
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school care in case of sufficient demand by the schools’ children. I use municipalities in the
neighboring cantons of Bern and Zurich as a control group. For the canton of Bern these
are the cantons of Aargau, Lucerne, Obwalden, and Nidwalden. The cantons to the West
and South are excluded from the analysis since these are cantons with a French speaking
majority, which have displayed very different trends with regards to childcare. I also
exclude the canton of Solothurn from the analysis as they introduce the same regulation as
Bern and Zurich but data on the actual provision of lunchtime and after-school care is not
available. The canton of Zurich shares a border with the cantons of Aargau, Zug, Schwyz,
Thurgau, St. Gallen, and Schaffhausen. Furthermore, all municipalities with lunchtime
and after-school care prior to the introduction of the new regulation are excluded from
the analysis. These municipalities clearly have different preferences and characteristics
than the rest (e.g., larger population, more support for left wing parties, higher taxes)
and show different trends from the rest. This is partly captured in data analyses of Swiss
national votes of the past three decades, which show that increasingly, there have been
diverging preferences between cities and the country-side (Koseki, 2017). The small scale
of Switzerland makes it equally likely that an individual in the control canton and in a
treated canton works in the city (see, e.g., Felfe et al. 2016), which alleviates the concern
that preferences of individuals commuting to the cities are affected differentially in the
treatment and control region.
The regulation concerning lunchtime and after-school care creates two distinct groups
of municipalities within a canton: those that are required to introduce lunchtime and
after-school care after assessing demand and those that are not. If ten or more kids are
signed up for any time slot, municipalities are required to provide these services. For a
municipality to be obligated to introduce lunchtime and after-school care, it only requires
a small fraction of parents in favor of such. Whether a municipality introduces school care
does therefore not necessarily reflect the preferences of the majority of the population of a
municipality. From the view of any single person, it is arbitrary, at least in the short term,
whether they live in a municipality where lunchtime and after-school care are introduced.
The effects of the regulation and the provision are estimated applying a differences-
in-differences (DiD) approach with two treatment margins: The provision effect measures
the effect of actually introducing childcare facilities. The regulation effect shows the
differential effect on vote outcomes from the introduction of the new regulation. The two
treatment margins are estimated with the following equation:
yesmt = α + γ1(provisionmt × regulationc × postt) + γ2(regulationct × postt)
+ρm + δt + βXmt + umt (1)
Y esmt refers to the share of voters approving of a bill voted upon at time t in munici-
pality m. Provisionmt indicates whether a municipality m has lunchtime and after-school
care at time t. Regulationc refers to an indicator variable whether a municipality is either
in the canton of Bern or Zurich and postt takes value 1 for the two ballots in the post
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period and 0 for the two ballots which took place prior to the introduction of the new reg-
ulation. The municipality specific coefficient γ1 shows the effect of introducing lunchtime
and after-school care on vote outcomes. The canton specific coefficient γ2 estimates the
treatment effect of the introduction of the regulation on lunchtime and after-school care,
i.e., the differential change in support of policies encouraging the compatibility of work and
family responsibilities between cantons with and without regulation concerning lunchtime
and after-school care, controlling for the effect of the actual provision. A vector of munic-
ipality fixed effects (ρm) and ballot fixed effects, estimated through δt, and are included.
Xmt is a vector of municipality characteristics and umt indicates the error term. Hence-
forth, I will refer to the effect on (provisionmt × regulationct × postt) as the provision
effect, and to the effect on regulationct × postt as the regulation effect for simplicity.
3.3 Identifying assumptions
The empirical strategy identifies two possible effects: a so-called regulation effect cap-
turing the change in voters’ support induced by higher perceived costs, and a provision
effect, which captures the change in voters’ support brought about by the actual pro-
vision of lunchtime and after-school care. Applying the strategy described above, the
regulation effect is identified by comparing municipalities in cantons with regulation but
without provision to municipalities in cantons without regulation. The provision effect is
identified by a within canton comparison in cantons with regulation. I compare munici-
palities which are obligated to introduce lunchtime and after-school care to municipalities
which are not obligated to introduce lunchtime and after-school care.
The identification of both effects relies on the common trends assumption. It requires
that voting behavior between the groups of municipalities being compared evolves in par-
allel. For the identification of the regulation effect, this implies that in the absence of the
regulation, vote outcomes in municipalities in cantons with regulation would have evolved
in parallel to vote outcomes in municipalities in cantons without regulation. The causal
identification of the provision effect requires that in the absence of the regulation and the
actual provision, vote outcomes in municipalities introducing lunchtime and after-school
care as a consequence of the regulation would have evolved in parallel to vote outcomes
in municipalities in the same cantons but which were not required to introduce lunchtime
and after-school care. The assumption that the regulation effect is the same in all treated
municipalities is quite strong. It requires that the perceived tax effect is the same in
municipalities with and without provision, which requires that individuals have the same
reaction to a perceived tax increase whether they directly observe actual provision in their
municipality or not. Column (1) in Appendix Table A.6 shows that the tax multiplier
does not change differentially in municipalities with provision compared to municipalities
with no provision from the pre- to the post-treatment period. This is encouraging as it
means that at least the actual tax change is constant across municipalities treated by the
regulation.
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Another issue might be reversed causality. If residents in a municipality are more
in favor of maternal employment, they are also more likely to introduce lunchtime and
after-school care. All municipalities with lunchtime and after-school care before the new
regulation was introduced are not considered in this analysis. For those municipalities,
I cannot credibly argue that they are on the same paths regarding their preferences.
In municipalities that did not have lunchtime and after-school care prior to the new
regulation, there were clearly no strong preferences regarding such institutions, otherwise
they would have introduced them endogenously. Differing attitudes that are time constant
are taken care of with the municipality fixed effects. Attitudes are strikingly persistent in
the absence of institutional changes (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 2013; Teso, 2019; Giuliano,
2017). I thus argue that similar trends in attitudes in the pre-treatment period are
indication enough that they would have continued to evolve in parallel in the absence of
the reform.
4 Data and Descriptives
Data on vote outcomes and municipality characteristics are freely available on the website
of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.11 I merge this data with data on income tax rates,
which was provided by Parchet (2014). Data on the provision of lunchtime and after-
school care for the canton of Zurich used to be freely available on the website of the
cantonal statistical office.12 For the canton of Bern, the same data was kindly provided
by the cantonal department of education (Erziehungsdepartement Bern). I additionally
include data on facilities receiving financial assistance through the federal impulse program
implemented to create more childcare places. These data are freely available on the
webpage of the Federal Social Insurance Office.13
In Switzerland, there have been a lot of municipality mergers over the years. All data
are aggregated and merged such that the data correspond to the municipalities existing
in 2016. In 2016, there were 2240 municipalities. Together, the municipalities in the
cantons included for the analysis had a population of 4.7 million in the year 2013. This
corresponds to about 60 percent of the Swiss population. Excluding all municipalities with
lunchtime or after-school care in 2004 leaves me with 32 percent of the total population
of Switzerland or 56 percent of the population in the cantons considered.
Enforcement of lunchtime and after-school care in the cantons of Bern and Zurich is
contingent on the number of parents who sign up their kids for these structures. Figures 3
and 4 indicate the presence of lunchtime and after-school care for all municipalities in the
11 Vote outcomes: www.bfs.admin.ch/asset/de/px-x-1703030000_101
Election National Council: www.pxweb.bfs.admin.ch/pxweb/de/px-x-1702020000_105
Population: www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/kataloge-datenbanken/tabellen.assetdetail.3262106.html
12The data was downloaded on 22 November, 2016 from the website of the cantonal statistical office
and for the years 2004 to 2013. However, when I last checked, the data was no longer publicly available.
13https://www.bsv.admin.ch/bsv/de/home/finanzhilfen/kinderbetreuung.html. The data are only
available on the German, French, or Italian version of the page, not on the English version.
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cantons of Bern and Zurich in the school year 2003/2004, before the introduction of
the new regulation, and for the school year 2012/2013. Since data on the prevalence
of lunchtime and after-school care in the year 2004 are only available for the canton of
Zurich, I proxy the supply in 2004 using data from the federal impulse program. The
data distinguish whether a facility is new or whether they receive financial aid to expand
the current supply, and on the exact date they start receiving financial aid. I define all
municipalities with a facility starting to receive financial aid for a new facility in 2006
or earlier as having lunchtime and after-school care prior to the introduction of the new
regulation. Additionally, I define all municipalities with a facility expanding its supply in
2009 or earlier as having lunchtime and after-school care before the new regulation was
introduced.14
(a) School year 2003/2004
No Provision
Provision
(b) School year 2012/2013
Figure 3: Prevalence of lunchtime and after-school care in the canton of Zurich before and
after the introduction of the new regulation. Light blue areas show municipalities which do not
offer lunchtime or after-school care in the given period, whereas dark blue areas show
municipalities with lunchtime and after-school care in the given period.
Figure 3 shows the prevalence of lunchtime and after-school care in the canton of
Zurich before and after the introduction of the new regulation. One immediately notices
a cluster of municipalities with after-school care in and around the city of Zurich and
along the lake of Zurich.15 All of these municipalities describe the metropolitan area of
Zurich. In the canton of Zurich, the municipalities which adopted lunchtime and after-
14The results are stable to changing the cutoff to an earlier or later year for new and expanding facilities
respectively.
15The city of Zurich is the largest municipality of the canton and can be found at the northern end of
the lake of Zurich, the white narrow area entering the canton from the south.
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school care are mostly in the more rural areas further away from the metropolitan areas
of Zurich and Winterthur.
The canton of Bern is larger in terms of the area it covers and has more rural munici-
palities. As in Zurich, the municipalities which have lunchtime and after-school care prior
to the introduction of the new regulation are mostly in the metropolitan areas around
the largest cities, Bern and Bienne, as shown in Figure 4. Since the canton of Bern has
more rural municipalities than the canton of Zurich, there are also more municipalities
introducing lunchtime and after-school care in Bern.
(a) School year 2003/2004
No Provision
Provision
(b) School year 2012/2013
Figure 4: Prevalence of lunchtime and after-school care in the canton of Bern before and after
the introduction of the new regulation. Light blue areas show municipalities which do not offer
lunchtime or after-school care in the given period, whereas dark blue areas show municipalities
with lunchtime and after-school care in the given period.
The municipalities in the cantons considered can be assigned to one of four groups:
The first group consists of municipalities which have lunchtime and after-school care
prior to the introduction of the new regulation, which are excluded from the analysis. The
remaining municipalities can be placed into three distinct groups: Within the cantons with
regulation, one group consists of all municipalities introducing lunchtime and after-school
care as a consequence of the regulation, and another group consists of all municipalities
where less than 10 children sign up for any slot and for which the new regulation is
therefore not binding. The third group consists of the remaining municipalities, i.e., the
municipalities in the control cantons, where there is no change in regulation. Figure 5
shows the population weighted means in vote outcomes for these three groups and for the
four federal ballots used in the analysis.
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Figure 5: Vote outcomes of bills promoting maternal employment in the municipalities with
no regulation (mun. in the control cantons), municipalities with regulation but no provision,
and municipalities with regulation and provision. The results displayed show population
weighted means in vote outcomes for each of the three groups.
Before 2010, i.e., before the new regulation became binding in the cantons of Bern
and Zurich, support for policies promoting maternal employment was on average lowest
in the municipalities in the control group and highest in municipalities with regulation
and provision. The pre-treatment differences cancel out in the DiD setting. After the
treatment, a convergence in vote outcomes between cantons with and without regulation is
observed: The average approval rate is now lowest in municipalities with regulation and no
provision and still highest in municipalities with regulation and provision. This raw graph
indicates that the introduction of the new regulation has, on average, a negative effect on
support of policies encouraging maternal employment, suggesting that the negative effect
from the increase in public expenditures outweighs the positive effect on voters’ attitudes
from the actual provision.
5 Results
The DiD estimates of Equation (1) measure the effect of the introduction of lunchtime and
after-school care at public schools (γ1) and the effect of only the regulation (γ2). Table 1
shows these measures for different specifications. All four specifications estimate Equa-
tion (1) using OLS. The observation unit are municipalities and the dependent variable
are vote outcomes of four ballots on family policy related topics, taking place between
1999 and 2013. To account for serial correlation, standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level.
The dependent variable in all four specifications is the approval rate on topic t in
municipalitym. In specifications (1) , (3), and (4), the sample consists of all municipalities
in the treated cantons Bern and Zurich, as well as the ten neighboring control cantons,
except for municipalities which already had lunchtime or after-school care prior to the
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Table 1: DiD estimates: Effect of lunchtime and after-school care on vote outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Provision 2.91*** 2.50*** 2.08*** 1.80***
(0.597) (0.702) (0.579) (0.600)
Regulation -9.71*** -8.72*** -7.66***
(0.503) (0.543) (0.930)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ballot FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inc. tax No No Yes No
Canton x ballot FE No No No Yes
Number of mun. 915 742 915 915
Number of obs. 3658 2966 3658 3658
Notes: This table presents the DiD estimates, γˆ1 and γˆ2, of Equation (1). The regulation coefficient
shows the differential change in vote outcomes of municipalities in cantons with regulation compared to
municipalities in cantons without regulation regarding lunchtime and after-school care in public schools,
controlling for the differences in provision within the treated cantons. The provision coefficient estimates
the differential change in vote outcomes in municipalities which introduce lunchtime and after-school
care as a consequence of the new regulation compared to those which do not. Inc. tax consists of the
income tax (cantonal + municipality + church taxes) for singles, married couples with no children, and
married couples with two children, each for yearly net incomes of CHF 80,000.-, 100,000.-, 150,000.-, and
200,000.-. In specification (4), canton × municipality FE are applied, and the regulation coefficient can
no longer be identified due to collinearity. In all specifications, population weights are applied to account
for the fact that municipalities differ in their population. The numbers in parentheses show the standard
errors, clustered at the municipal level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
introduction of the new regulation. Municipality and time fixed effects are included in
all specifications.16 The variable provision takes value 1 for all municipalities which have
lunchtime and after-school care after the regulation requiring them to do so in case of
sufficient demand is introduced. It takes value 0 for all other municipalities and for the
pre-treatment period. The variable regulation takes value 1 for all municipalities in the
cantons with regulation (Bern and Zurich) in the post-treatment period and value 0 in
the pre-treatment period and for all municipalities in the neighboring cantons.
The estimates in specification (1) show that as a consequence of the introduction of
lunchtime and after-school care, support for policies promoting maternal employment in-
creases by 2.91 percentage points compared to municipalities with no provision. However,
this positive effect is more than offset by a decrease in support of 9.71 percentage points
compared to the control group.
16 The regulation variable is defined at the cantonal level, taking value one for the cantons with
regulation of lunchtime and after-school care and zero otherwise. It can therefore not by identified in the
presence of cantonal time trends, as applied in specification (4).
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Specification (2) shows the same effect for the sub-sample of municipalities where a
majority of voters voted against the 2004 bill on maternity leave to make sure that the
effect is not purely driven by municipalities which already have positive attitudes towards
maternal employment prior to the introduction of the new regulation. The 2004 bill is
used to make this distinction as this bill was approved at the ballots by a majority of
voters (56 percent). An approval rate below 50 percent therefore indicates approval below
the Swiss average; these municipalities were outvoted by the rest of Switzerland. This
restriction reduces the sample to 742 municipalities. Both the provision effect and the
regulation effect become slightly smaller through this restriction, remain, however, highly
significant.
In specification (3), tax rates for different income levels and family types are added.
It is of course not feasible to control for all tax rates for all family types. The inclusion of
these should decrease the regulation effect at least by some its real part, if it is driven by
a tax increase. If the regulation effect is purely driven by the perception of a tax increase,
this will not be captured by this inclusion. The regulation coefficient in specification
(3) decreases by 21 percent compared to the regulation effect found in specification (1),
which is based on the same sample of municipalities. While I cannot conclude that the
regulation effect is purely driven by a real tax increase, this solidifies the hypothesis that
the introduction of the new regulation leads to a reduction of approval rates due to a
(perceived) tax increase.
Specification (4) includes canton × ballot fixed effects. In their presence, the regulation
effect can no longer be identified due to collinearity. However, it allows me to control for
cantonal changes over time which are homogeneous across municipalities, such as changes
in the cantonal tax schedule. In Appendix Tables A.5 and A.6, I take a closer look at
how such variables might change differentially between treated and control cantons, and
within the treated cantons across municipalities with provision and without. I look at
the municipality tax multiplier, voter turnout, the birth rate as a fraction of a munici-
pality’s population, as well as the immigration and emigration rates. These variable are
not directly added to the estimation, since they might be bad controls. Especially voter
turnout and immigration rates might be mechanisms rather than changes happening inde-
pendently from the treatment. It is conceivable that changes in tax rates lead to migration
across cantonal borders, or that the introduction of lunchtime and after-school care at-
tracts families with positive attitudes towards maternal employment to a municipality. It
is further possible that voter turnout declines in municipalities with provision as there is
no longer the same necessity for investments towards institutional childcare. Appendix
Table A.5 shows the results of regressing these variables on provision and regulation,
including municipality fixed effects and ballot fixed effects. The results show that in mu-
nicipalities with regulation, voter turnout and the emigration rate increase compared to
the control cantons. The increase in the emigration rate is in line with the theory on tax
mobility: If taxes increase, individuals are more likely to move away, e.g., to a neighbor-
ing canton. It is less clear why we would see a positive correlation between regulation
18
and turnout. Considering regulation and provision jointly, there is a significant increase
in voter turnout in municipalities with regulation and no provision compared to munic-
ipalities with no regulation, while municipalities with regulation and provision move in
parallel to municipalities with no regulation. An explanation could be that individuals in
municipalities with just regulation but no provision want to make sure that there were no
additional subsidies for maternal employment, which is reflected in increased turnout.17
Compared to that, municipalities with provision experience a benefit in addition to the
costs, which leads to no change overall compared to the municipalities in cantons with no
regulation.
Appendix Table A.6 shows the same results as Table A.5 but allowing for canton ×
ballot fixed effects. First, this allows me to additionally look at the tax multiplier as a
dependent variable, as the canton × ballot fixed effects control for changes in the cantonal
tax schedules. As detailed above, within the cantons with regulation, I do not expect the
municipality tax multiplier of municipalities with provision to change differently to the
tax multiplier of municipalities with no provision; the public costs of the new facilities are
born by the cantons. This is confirmed in column (1) of Table A.6. The tax multiplier
does not change differentially in municipalities with provision compared to municipalities
with no provision. Even after controlling for canton × ballot fixed effects, there is still the
negative change in voter turnout as described above. There is also a slight reduction in
birth rates of 0.5 percent, which is significant at the 10 percent level. This change seems,
however, arbitrary since, if anything, we would expect birth rates to increase if there are
more childcare facilities. While immigration into municipalities is no longer significant
and much smaller than in the specification without canton × ballot fixed effects, it is still
sizable and pointing towards increased migration into municipalities with provision within
cantons with regulation.18
The results suggest that the introduction of lunchtime and after-school care increase
support of policies facilitating maternal employment by 1.8 to 2.9 percentage points. The
regulation itself seems to decrease support for policies facilitating maternal employment by
8.7 to 9.7 percent, which can be explained by (perceived) public costs of these institutions,
as shown in specification (3). This point will be analyzed in more detail in Section 6.1.
17Appendix Table A.7 indeed shows that turnout and voter support are negatively correlated.
18Appendix Table A.7 shows the same estimations as Table 1 including all of these variables as co-
variates. If the provision and regulation effects are purely driven by changes in attitudes or perceived
instead of real tax effects, they should still be present after the inclusion of these covariates. While they
decrease in magnitude in absolute terms, both effects persist in the presence of these covariates in most
specification. While still positive, the provision effect is no longer significant when canton × ballot fixed
effects are included in addition to the covariates. I can therefore not reject the hypothesis, that the
provision effect is purely driven by real reactions to the introduction of lunchtime and after-school care.
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6 Discussion
6.1 Public Expenditures and Vote Outcomes
Cantons in Switzerland are free in setting the cantonal tax schedule and deductions. It is
therefore not feasible to consider the full tax schedule for all incomes and family types in
the analysis above. The costs of lunchtime and after-school care are partly borne by the
parents, partly by the cantons and municipalities. The municipal and cantonal costs are
reflected in an increase in public expenditure, which would result in a tax increase ceteris
paribus.
Figure 6 shows the relative change in income taxes in cantons with regulation compared
to those without for different income levels. There is a separate tax schedule for married
couples and for singles. Furthermore, married couples with children can make different tax
deductions than those without children, including deductions of formal childcare costs.
Figure 6 displays the results of running Equation 2 separately for each level of income
and for married, married with two kids, and single households. Taxymt refers to the tax
rate on income y in municipality m at time t.
taxymt = β
y + µy1(provision
y
mt × regulationyct × postt) + µy2(regulationyct × postt)
+ρym + δ
y
t + v
y
mt (2)
Each dot shows the coefficient estimate of µ2 of Equation 2 and its confidence bound.
The relative tax rates for married couples with no children and for singles remain fairly
constant for low incomes and increase for incomes above median income. For married
couples with two children, the relative tax rates only increase at the very top, which is
incomes above CHF 200,000. Singles on average experience the largest tax increase and
singles are also less likely to vote in support of policies promoting maternal employment in
the post-treatment period (Appendix Table A.3). However, the time window considered
here is quite large and there might be other changes in cantonal and municipal tax rates
that are uncorrelated to the expansion of public childcare. Furthermore, I do not have
information on why and how tax rates were adjusted for each municipality.
In a next step, I will look at the canton of Bern separately. I have more detailed
data on the costs of lunchtime and after-school care in Bern, which allows for a better
understanding of the interaction of public expenditure and vote outcomes.
The total costs of lunchtime and after-school care in the canton of Bern in the year
2013 amount to about CHF 50.7 million, which corresponds to approximately 0.3 percent
of total cantonal tax income or CHF 13.- per hour and child. About 24 percent of the
costs are born by the parents directly. The remaining CHF 38.8 million correspond to
0.27 percent of total public expenditures or 0.68 percent of total income and wealth tax
revenue of the canton of Bern for the year 2013.19
19Data on tax revenue can be downloaded from the website of the Swiss Federal Finance Administration:
www.efv.admin.ch/efv/de/home/themen/finanzstatistik/berichterstattung
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Figure 6: Estimated differential change in cantonal income tax between the cantons with
regulation and control cantons for different incomes (CHF 20,000 to CHF 1,000,000) and for
different types of tax payers (married, married with two children, single). Each dot shows a
coefficient estimate µy2 of Equation 2 and its 95 percent confidence interval, i.e. the differential
change in income taxes for an individual with income y given they are married, married with
two children, or single. The corresponding estimates are displayed in Appendix Table A.8.
If the hypothesis that voter support decreases when taxes are increased holds, I expect
that in the group of municipalities with provision of lunchtime and after-school care, the
positive effect of the provision on attitudes should decrease as per capita costs borne by
the municipality increase.
Figure 7 shows the population weighted means in vote outcomes for municipalities in
the canton of Bern and for each of the four ballots. It distinguishes between municipalities
with provision of lunchtime and after-school care and per capita costs below the median,
and municipalities with provision and costs above the median. Comparing the groups
with higher and lower costs, there is no difference in the pre-treatment period. In the
post-treatment period, support of family policy related topics increases in the group of
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Figure 7: Vote outcomes of bills promoting maternal employment for the canton of Bern in
municipalities with regulation but no provision and municipalities with regulation and
provision. The results displayed show population weighted means in vote outcomes for the two
groups.
municipalities with costs below the median compared to municipalities with costs above
the median.
Table 2 introduces costs into the model specified in Equation (1). Since information
on costs is only available for the canton of Bern, only municipalities in this cantons
are considered for this analysis and for the treated group. The first specification shows
the baseline effect for the canton of Bern before the inclusion of costs. The estimate
on provision is still positive and no different from the effect found in the estimation
including the canton of Zurich (Table 1, specification (4)). In specification (2), provision
is interacted with a dummy variable indicating costs above median costs for municipalities
with provision of lunchtime and after-school care.20 The estimate now indicates that for
the group of municipalities with provision of lunchtime and after-school care and with
costs below the median, there is a significant positive effect of the provision on vote
outcomes. The effect for municipalities with costs above median costs is not significantly
different. An additional test shows that the total provision effect for the group with
high costs is not significantly different from zero (H0 : θprovision + θD.costs>p50×prov. = 0).
Specification (3) introduces a continuous variable of per capita costs. It confirms that
there is a positive effect of provision on approval rates, which is decreasing in per capita
costs. Specification (4) additionally includes the covariates discussed in detail above. As
discussed, these covariates might be bad controls. However, now that I am able to control
for per capita costs born by the public, there is still a significant and positive effect of
provision on support for policies promoting maternal employment, which corroborates the
hypothesis that the introduction of lunchtime and after-school care has a direct effect on
voter’s attitudes.
20The p.c. costs per municipality and year and after redistribution range from CHF -17.- to CHF 37.-,
with a mean of CHF 6.53.- and median of CHF 4.07.-.
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Table 2: DiD estimates for municipalities in the canton of Bern and control cantons, including
per capita costs of institutions borne by the public
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Provision 1.77** 2.39*** 2.68*** 1.40**
(0.729) (0.751) (0.694) (0.632)
D.cost> p50 × prov. -1.46
(1.053)
Cost × prov. -0.13** -0.11**
(0.056) (0.045)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x ballot FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates No No No Yes
Number of mun. 804 804 804 804
Number of obs. 3214 3214 3214 3214
Notes: This table presents the DiD estimate of the provision effect for municipalities in the canton of
Bern only. The provision coefficient estimates the differential change in vote outcomes in municipalities
introducing lunchtime and after-school care as a consequence of the new regulation compared to those
that do not. All four specifications include canton × ballot fixed effects. Specification (2) includes an
interaction term of provision and a dummy variable indicating per capita costs of lunchtime and after-
school care that surpass median costs. Specifications (3) and (4) include an interaction term of provision
and a continuous per capita costs variable. All specifications include municipality fixed effects. Covariates
include voter turnout, municipality tax multiplier, immigration rate, emigration rate, and birth rate. In
all specifications, population weights are applied to account for the fact that municipalities differ in their
size. The numbers in parentheses show the standard errors, clustered at the municipality level. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A possible explanation for the differing costs is that not all municipalities receive
subsidies from the federal impulse program. Municipalities receiving subsidies from the
federal impulse program seem to have lower costs, on average, than municipalities which
do not receive subsidies.21 Why some municipalities do not receive subsidies is unclear.
In fact, since lunchtime and after-school care facilities are only opened in case of sufficient
demand and since they already have to satisfy cantonal quality guidelines, they also fulfill
the requirements to qualify for the impulse program. It is therefore unclear why some
municipalities do not receive any subsidies.
The effect of costs on vote outcomes should therefore not be taken at face values.
A more detailed analysis of why per capita costs after parental contributions and after
wages differ is necessary. Also, a closer investigation of how voters become aware of costs
is needed. Due to the data restrictions, the current setting does, unfortunately, not allow
21Applying the same sample restrictions as above, there are 27 municipalities which receive subsidies
and 88 municipalities which do not receive subsidies. Per capita costs are CHF 7.18.- in municipalities
receiving subsidies and CHF 10.09.- in municipalities not receiving subsidies on average.
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for a more detailed analysis of the mechanisms. Nevertheless, the costs of institutions in
place seem to play an important role in voters’ subsequent support of related policies.
6.2 Placebo test
As a robustness test, I use vote outcomes of ballots unrelated to family policy to show
that the approach I apply generally works and to make sure the results are not driven
by differing trends of treatment and control groups in general. One of the topics voted
upon most frequently are healthcare related bills. These thus offer a good opportunity to
look at general trends in vote outcomes between the three groups. Vote outcomes of all
14 ballots on healthcare related topics taking place between 1999 and 2014 are displayed
in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Vote outcomes of 14 bills on healthcare related topics in the municipalities with no
regulation (mun. in the control cantons), municipalities with regulation but no provision, and
municipalities with regulation and provision. The results displayed show population weighted
means in vote outcomes for each of the three groups.
Figure 8 shows population weighted means of vote outcome for the three groups, mu-
nicipalities in the control cantons, municipalities in the cantons with regulation concerning
lunchtime and after-school care with actual provision, and municipalities in the cantons
with regulation which do not introduce lunchtime or after-school care. The sample is
restricted to municipalities which did not have lunchtime or after-school care in 2004 to
mirror the sample used for the main analysis. The graph shows no systematic differences
in vote outcomes between the three groups: While there are divergences for some ballots,
these are small and don’t seem to follow any systematic pattern.
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Table 3: Effect of lunchtime and after-school care on vote outcomes on healthcare related
topics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Provision -0.43 0.49 0.12 0.26 0.06
(0.413) (0.396) (0.404) (0.401) (0.408)
Regulation -1.53*** -1.32* -0.26
(0.372) (0.759) (0.732)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ballot FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inc. tax No Yes Yes No No
Covariates No No Yes No Yes
Canton x ballot FE No No No Yes Yes
Number of mun. 915 915 915 915 915
Number of obs. 5486 5486 5486 5486 5486
Notes: This table presents the DiD estimate, γˆ1 and γˆ2, of Equation 1 at the municipal level. Instead
of using family policy related ballots, totally independent ballots taking place on the same day are used
for the post treatment period. The regulation coefficient shows the differential change in vote outcomes
of municipalities in cantons with regulation compared to municipalities in cantons without regulation
regarding lunchtime and after-school care in public schools. The provision coefficient estimates the dif-
ferential change in vote outcomes in municipalities which introduce lunchtime and after-school care as a
consequence of the new regulation compared to those that do not. For the three baseline specifications,
only municipalities with no childcare in 2004 are included. For the subsample specifications only mu-
nicipalities where a majority of voters voted against maternity leave and that did not have lunchtime or
after-school care prior to the introduction of the new regulation are included, i.e., municipalities which did
not display positive attitudes towards an expansion of public investment encouraging maternal employ-
ment before the new regulation regarding lunchtime and after-school care was introduced. The numbers
in parentheses show the standard errors, clustered at the municipal level. In all specifications, population
weights are applied to account for the fact, that municipalities differ in their size. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
I repeat the analysis of family policy bills, now using health bills. I thereby use all
referenda on health related bills taking place between 1999 and 2004 for the pre-treatment
period and between 2010 and 2014 for the post-treatment period. For easier comparability,
I focus on referenda. All referenda are proposals of the parliament, with a majority of the
parliament and the federal council already in favor of the bill. This leaves me with a total
of six bills that are for instance on an amendment of the law concerning transplantation
medicine or stem cell research. The bills are described in detail in Appendix A.1.
Table 3 shows the results of estimating Equation 1 using approval rates for healthcare
related bills as the dependent variable. Specification (1) shows small and negative corre-
lation between provision and approval rates, which is not significant at any conventional
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level. Albeit more than 6 times smaller than in the main analysis, there is also a negative
correlation between regulation and approval rates for healthcare related bills, which is
highly significant. This might indicate a general bias towards the status quo after tax
increases. Once I control for cantonal taxes for some incomes and family types, the esti-
mate decreases in size in absolute terms, as shown in specification (2) and becomes very
close to zero when I further add the covariates described above. These results indicate,
that the tax increases in the cantons of Bern and Zurich compared to the control cantons
are reflected in voters being more likely to vote for the status quo. I would therefore gen-
erally hesitate to interpret the regulation effect as causal, since I cannot fully attribute
the changes in the cantons of Bern and Zurich compared to the control cantons to the
introduction of the regulation. On the other hand, the estimate on provision is very small
and insignificant in all specifications when approval rates of health care related bills are
used as the dependent variable. This adds additional validity to the approach and the
conclusion that these changes within cantons can in fact be attributed to the introduction
of lunchtime and after-school care.
7 Conclusion
Many OECD countries devote considerable resources to the provision of public childcare
services. The main goal of such efforts is to promote gender equality in employment. As
recent literature indicates, the main reason behind the different impacts of children on
employment patterns across countries are likely related to gender norms and attitudes
towards working mothers (see, e.g., Kleven et al. 2019).
This paper addresses the question whether childcare institutions affect individuals’
attitudes towards working mothers. I find that the exogenous introduction of lunchtime
and after-school care at public schools increases voters’ support of policies by about 2 per-
centage points and already in a rather short term (3 years after the introduction). This
positive effect is, however, decreasing in the costs of new institutions: Voters seem to be
very aware that new institutions will give rise to increased public expenditures, which
reduces voters’ support for additional policies promoting maternal employment. Never-
theless, my results show that in addition to the effect on maternal employment, childcare
institutions have the potential of changing attitudes of individuals who are not directly
exposed, and therefore of changing norms concerning parenthood. This might also con-
tribute to the explanation why countries with a long tradition of parental leave and public
childcare have considerably more positive attitudes towards working mothers, since there
is not only the direct effect of the policies but also the indirect effect through individuals’
norms.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional information on ballots
Family policy related ballots
Campaign posters of ballots related to family policy
(a) Maternity Leave. It asks “State Children?”
and recommends to vote no.
(b) Family Initiative. Implies crying children if
voters support traditional family model and vice
versa.
(c) Family Policy. It asks “State Children?” and recommends to vote no.
Figure A.1: Campaigns by the Swiss People Party
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Ballots related to health topics
7 February 1999
• The ballot was concerning transplantation medicine.
• Constitutional referendum
• Approval rate: 87.8 percent; turnout: 37.98 percent
• The question was whether an article concerning transplantation medicine should be
added to the constitution. The problem was that even though hospitals had been
successfully transplanting organs, tissue, and cells for more than thirty years, there
was no federal law regulating these practices. There were some cantonal laws in
place but those varied substantially between cantons and were missing important
aspects. In other cantons there was no regulation whatsoever. The new consti-
tutional article was going to include regulations on how the federation planned to
protect human dignity, personality, and health of the patient and the donor, as
well as how organs should be allocated rightfully. Also, the article was to prevent
malpractice by forbidding trade of organs and targeted donations.
28 November 2004
• Ballot concerning stem cell research
• Approval rate: 66.4 percent; turnout: 37.02 percent
• Legislative referendum
• The bill proposed a new law concerning research with stem cells. The new law was
going to make embryonal stem cell research possible in Switzerland. Among other
things, it was going to require each research project to be evaluated concerning
ethical and scientific criteria. Also, stem cells for research projects are only allowed
to be harvested if derived from embryos which developed from eggs fertilized in
vitro, but which could not be used for a pregnancy.
7 March 2010
• Ballot concerning research with human subjects
• Approval rate: 77.2 percent; turnout: 45.49 percent
• Constitutional referendum
• The bill proposed a constitutional article regulating research with human subjects.
At the federal level, there are only regulations concerning some parts of this re-
search. Most of the responsibilities are at the cantonal level, where there are large
disparities, with some cantons not having any regulations in place whatsoever. The
new article establishes that research with human subjects can only be undertaken
with their full consent and and only allows research with children or other vulnerable
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individuals only in case that the findings cannot be realized with consenting adults.
Furthermore, the article stipulates that the risks and strain on participants must
be in balance with the benefit of the research project. Also, the article establishes
ethical guidelines and guidelines concerning the protection of participants’ dignity.
17 June 2012
• Ballot concerning statutory health insurance
• Approval rate: 24.0 percent; turnout: 38.65 percent
• Legislative referendum
• Every person living in Switzerland must have health insurance. One can choose
between different insurance policies, differing in the deductible and restrictions con-
cerning the free choice of doctor or hospital and accordingly, the insurance pre-
miums. The bill proposed the implementation of new healthcare networks with
doctors, pharmacies, hospitals, nursing homes, and midwives. Patients would be
treated within these networks, which would promote better cooperation between
healthcare providers.
22. September 2013
• Ballot concerning amendment of epidemics law
• Approval rate: 60 percent; turnout: 46.76 percent
• Legislative referendum
• The currently valid law concerning epidemic diseases dated back to 1970 and did
not provide sufficient protection against transmittable diseases. The new law was
going to provide the ground on which transmittable diseases could be identified in
a timely manner and fought efficiently, and new measures against the increasing
problem of antibiotic resistance implemented. Also, responsibilities would be more
clearly assigned between cantonal and federal governments.
18. Mai 2014
• Ballot concerning primary health care
• Approval rate: 88.1 percent; turnout: 55.85 percent
• Constitutional referendum (counter proposal to a popular initiative demanding the
support of primary care physicians)
• The proposed constitutional article was going to promote primary health care in gen-
eral and specifically primary care physicians. The parliament proposed this article
as a reaction to the initiative "Yes to primary health care" (Ja zur Hausarztmedi-
zin), submitted by primary care physicians. As a reaction to the proposed article,
the physicians withdrew their initiative.
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A.2 Tables and figures
Post-vote survey
In order to gain some insight into how personal characteristics and attitudes towards
gender equality are reflected in vote outcomes, I use data of post-vote surveys provided
by FORS Lausanne. The post-vote surveys are conducted after each federal ballot with
a representative sample of about 1,500 eligible voters and take place in the two to three
weeks following a ballot. Surveyed topics include individual socioeconomic characteristics,
political opinions and habits, as well as various aspects related to the decision to vote on
certain topics.
The tables in this section show statistics from the post vote surveys, conducted after
each vote. Data from individuals from all parts of Switzerland are considered. Table
A.1 shows descriptive statistics of the surveys conducted after each of the four ballots
considered in this paper. The table further indicates the gender difference, as well as
whether the difference is statistically significant. The table shows that the shares of men
and women with tertiary education have increased over time, but while the increase was
rather small for men, the fraction of women with tertiary education has increased from
6.6% in 1999 to about 15% in 2013. Nevertheless, the gender difference is still more than
10ppt and remains statistically significant for all four ballots considered. The only other
variable which is significant in all four ballots is employment: men are about 14ppt more
likely to be employed than women. The employment fractions seem very low at first sight.
However, in the post vote survey, everybody who does not have any formal employment
is considered not employed. This includes retired individuals, who constitute about one
third of the total sample.
All the variables displayed in table A.1 are also considered in the regressions in table
A.3. The estimates show a significant positive effect of age and whether an individual
is employed on the probability that somebody votes yes. In the maternity leave ballot
in 1999, older people were less likely to vote yes. In the 2004 maternity leave and the
family policy ballot, there is a positive correlation between tertiary education and the
probability to vote yes. However, the biggest correlation is found between party affinity
and the probability to vote yes: voters describing themselves as affiliated with the Social
Party (SP), the biggest left wing party in CH, are 21% to 42% more likely to vote yes,
whereas voters describing themselves as affiliated with the Swiss People Party (SVP), the
biggest right wing party, are 35% to 42% less likely to vote yes. Affiliation with other
parties does not have any correlation with voting behavior.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of post-vote surveys
Men Women Diff. Std. Error Obs. Men Obs. Women
Maternity Leave I
Yes Share 0.339 0.380 -0.041 0.040 236 358
Tertiary Educ. 0.203 0.067 0.136*** 0.029 236 358
Employed 0.581 0.430 0.150*** 0.042 236 358
Age/10 5.374 5.291 0.083 0.139 236 358
Retired 0.297 0.246 0.051 0.038 236 358
Married 0.708 0.656 0.051 0.039 236 358
Income < CHF 5, 000 0.335 0.413 -0.079* 0.040 236 358
Income CHF 5, 000− 11, 000 0.492 0.455 0.036 0.042 236 358
Income > CHF 11, 000 0.174 0.131 0.042 0.031 236 358
Maternity Leave II
Yes Share 0.656 0.604 0.052 0.044 209 270
Tertiary Educ. 0.239 0.126 0.113*** 0.036 209 270
Employed 0.641 0.489 0.152*** 0.045 209 270
Age/10 5.062 5.386 -0.324** 0.161 209 270
Retired 0.234 0.270 -0.036 0.040 209 270
Married 0.598 0.619 -0.020 0.045 209 270
Income < CHF 5, 000 0.368 0.437 -0.069 0.045 209 270
Income CHF 5, 000− 11, 000 0.445 0.419 0.026 0.046 209 270
Income > CHF 11, 000 0.187 0.144 0.042 0.034 209 270
Family Policy
Yes Share 0.469 0.507 -0.037 0.045 213 304
Tertiary Educ. 0.277 0.168 0.109*** 0.037 213 304
Employed 0.563 0.454 0.109** 0.044 213 304
Age/10 5.571 5.703 -0.132 0.137 213 304
Retired 0.291 0.359 -0.067 0.042 213 304
Married 0.648 0.599 0.049 0.043 213 304
Income < CHF 5, 000 0.315 0.378 -0.064 0.042 213 304
Income CHF 5, 000− 11, 000 0.610 0.563 0.048 0.044 213 304
Income > CHF 11, 000 0.075 0.059 0.016 0.023 213 304
Family Initiative
Yes Share 0.522 0.592 -0.070 0.045 203 294
Tertiary Educ. 0.256 0.136 0.120*** 0.037 203 294
Employed 0.547 0.401 0.145*** 0.045 203 294
Age/10 5.729 5.691 0.037 0.143 203 294
Retired 0.296 0.378 -0.082* 0.043 203 294
Married 0.704 0.588 0.116*** 0.043 203 294
Income < CHF 5, 000 0.296 0.435 -0.140*** 0.043 203 294
Income CHF 5, 000− 11, 000 0.601 0.507 0.094** 0.045 203 294
Income > CHF 11, 000 0.103 0.058 0.046* 0.025 203 294
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the four ballots considered, as well as whether there is
a significant difference between men and women.
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Table A.2: Post-Vote Survey: Correlation between the probability to vote yes and attitudes
towards gender equality
Bill Mat. Leave I Mat. Leave II Fam. Pol. Fam. Init.
Gender Equality 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Age/10 -0.22** 0.00 -0.04 0.20**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Age2 0.02* -0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tertiary Educ. 0.03 0.11* 0.09* -0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Female 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Employed 0.11** 0.02 0.00 0.12**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Income CHF 5, 000− 11, 000 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 0.09*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Income > CHF 11, 000 -0.02 -0.02 -0.14 0.20**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09)
Retired -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.13
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Married 0.01 0.00 0.11** -0.14***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.79*** 0.62*** 0.46* -0.19
(0.23) (0.20) (0.26) (0.24)
Number of Observations 569 469 511 490
R-Square 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.06
Notes: Correlation between the probability to vote "Yes" in the four bills considered and personal
attitudes towards gender equality. Calculations draw on post-vote surveys conducted with a random
sample of Swiss voters. The table shows that attitudes towards gender equality are an important driver
of vote results in the ballots considered. Gender equality is a dummy variable based on the question "Are
you in favor of Switzerland actively promoting female equality to men (survey question A91h≤3) or in
favor of Switzerland favoring neither men nor women (survey question 3 < A91 <= 6).
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Table A.3: Post-Vote Survey: Correlation between the probability to vote yes and certain
personal characteristics
Bill Mat. Leave I Mat. Leave II Fam. Pol. Fam. Init. All
Age/10 -0.25*** -0.06 -0.01 0.18* -0.05
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.04)
Age2 0.02** 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Tertiary Educ. 0.03 0.09* 0.11** 0.00 0.06**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
Female 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02)
Employed 0.08* 0.03 0.01 0.14** 0.07***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Income CHF 5, 000− 11, 000 -0.04 -0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Income > CHF 11, 000 -0.05 -0.02 -0.15* 0.18** -0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03)
Retired -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.16* 0.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04)
Married 0.02 0.02 0.08* -0.11** 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Affinity CVP -0.02 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.07
(0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04)
Affinity FDP 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04)
Affinity SP 0.42*** 0.34*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.29***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Affinity SVP -0.31*** -0.42*** -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.32***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Constant 0.97*** 0.81*** 0.49** -0.08 0.46***
(0.21) (0.18) (0.24) (0.22) (0.11)
Ballot FE No No No No Yes
Number of Observations 594 479 517 497 2087
R-Square 0.17 0.24 0.09 0.13 0.16
Notes: Correlation between probability to vote yes and certain personal characteristics based on post-
vote surveys. All four ballots are considered. Both models include ballot fixed effects.
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Descriptive statistics
Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics
Mat. Leave I Mat. Leave II Family Policy Family Init.
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Regulation and Provision
Share of Yes votes 31.41 (8.13) 49.15 (8.76) 44.05 (8.29) 51.88 (7.47)
Tax multiplier 48.91 (57.54) 44.62 (53.31) 43.21 (51.64) 43.21 (51.64)
Share of SPP voters 37.69 (11.24) 38.26 (10.64) 36.10 (8.64) 36.10 (8.64)
Share of SP voters 22.29 (6.30) 22.79 (6.61) 15.29 (4.88) 15.29 (4.88)
Voter turnout 47.05 (5.27) 53.69 (6.15) 44.78 (6.36) 54.67 (7.26)
Births in % of pop 1.06 (0.26) 4.80 (0.84) 12.37 (2.08) 12.37 (2.08)
Deaths in % of pop 0.82 (0.31) 3.86 (1.15) 10.08 (3.11) 10.08 (3.11)
Immigrants in % of pop 7.49 (2.23) 36.18 (8.02) 97.61 (18.62) 97.61 (18.62)
Emigrants in % of pop 7.10 (2.09) 33.43 (7.14) 89.08 (16.96) 89.08 (16.96)
Population in 1000 3.78 (4.58) 3.93 (4.66) 4.32 (5.19) 4.32 (5.19)
Number of Mun. 192 192 192 192
Regulation and No Provision
Share of Yes votes 28.94 (11.75) 44.21 (11.15) 38.99 (10.99) 44.98 (8.53)
Tax multiplier 20.24 (43.07) 18.22 (40.08) 17.83 (39.22) 17.83 (39.22)
Share of SPP voters 47.20 (12.89) 46.77 (12.28) 43.53 (10.82) 43.53 (10.82)
Share of SP voters 19.00 (8.13) 18.66 (7.94) 12.09 (5.55) 12.09 (5.55)
Voter turnout 46.50 (8.25) 50.75 (8.41) 43.61 (6.82) 55.67 (10.40)
Births in % of pop 1.08 (0.45) 4.83 (1.25) 12.94 (2.68) 12.94 (2.68)
Deaths in % of pop 0.95 (0.54) 4.29 (1.32) 11.88 (3.32) 11.88 (3.32)
Immigrants in % of pop 6.35 (2.56) 31.40 (8.75) 89.44 (20.01) 89.44 (20.01)
Emigrants in % of pop 6.40 (2.31) 30.60 (7.78) 87.71 (19.29) 87.71 (19.29)
Population in 1000 0.91 (0.85) 0.92 (0.86) 0.95 (0.91) 0.95 (0.91)
Number of Mun. 234 234 233 233
No Regulation
Share of Yes votes 22.11 (6.05) 37.77 (8.06) 39.96 (6.93) 50.08 (6.74)
Tax multiplier 121.74 (70.71) 116.82 (63.79) 104.60 (54.56) 104.60 (54.56)
Share of SPP voters 34.17 (10.28) 37.99 (10.94) 38.59 (9.01) 38.59 (9.01)
Share of SP voters 13.90 (6.92) 15.08 (7.53) 13.12 (6.31) 13.12 (6.31)
Voter turnout 47.83 (7.65) 55.42 (6.77) 46.39 (7.54) 53.84 (6.33)
Births in % of pop 1.16 (0.34) 5.05 (1.02) 12.53 (2.85) 12.53 (2.85)
Deaths in % of pop 0.72 (0.28) 3.46 (0.95) 8.75 (2.62) 8.75 (2.62)
Immigrants in % of pop 6.78 (2.05) 32.73 (7.85) 90.06 (24.25) 90.06 (24.25)
Emigrants in % of pop 6.63 (1.86) 31.08 (7.22) 82.12 (22.80) 82.12 (22.80)
Population in 1000 2.76 (3.31) 2.87 (3.44) 3.21 (3.77) 3.21 (3.77)
Number of Mun. 453 453 453 453
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the municipalities included in the main analysis and
for each of the three groups (no regulation, regulation and provision, regulation and no provision.
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Analysis of covariates
Table A.5: DiD estimates of the introduction of lunchtime and after-school care on covariates
Dep. var. Turnout Births Immig. Emig.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Provision -2.02*** -0.26 6.32*** 1.22
(0.54) (0.21) (2.00) (1.97)
Regulation 2.64*** 0.49 3.04 7.60***
(0.41) (0.30) (2.33) (2.17)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ballot FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Mun. 915 922 922 922
Number of Obs. 3658 3688 3688 3688
Notes: This table presents the DiD estimates, γˆ1 and γˆ2, of Equation (1), but with variables other than
vote outcomes as the dependent variable. The regulation coefficient shows the differential change in these
covariates of municipalities in cantons with regulation compared to municipalities in cantons without
regulation regarding lunchtime and after-school care in public schools, controlling for the differences in
provision within the treated cantons. The provision coefficient estimates the differential change in the
covariates in municipalities which introduce lunchtime and after-school care as a consequence of the new
regulation compared to those which do not. The numbers in parentheses show the standard errors,
clustered at the municipal level. In all specifications, population weights are applied to account for the
fact, that municipalities differ in their size. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A.6: DiD estimates of the introduction of lunchtime and after-school care on a set of
covariates, including cantonal time trends
Dep. var. Tax Multiplier Turnout Births Immig. Emig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Provision 0.45 -1.96*** -0.49* 2.93 -1.19
(0.63) (0.66) (0.27) (2.06) (2.16)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x ballot FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Mun. 922 915 922 922 922
Number of Obs. 3688 3658 3688 3688 3688
Notes: This table presents the DiD estimates, γˆ1 and γˆ2, of Equation (1), but with variables other than
vote outcomes as the dependent variable. The regulation coefficient shows the differential change in these
covariates of municipalities in cantons with regulation compared to municipalities in cantons without
regulation regarding lunchtime and after-school care in public schools, controlling for the differences in
provision within the treated cantons. The provision coefficient estimates the differential change in the
covariates in municipalities which introduce lunchtime and after-school care as a consequence of the new
regulation compared to those which do not. The Regulation coefficient can no longer be identified in
the presence of canton × Ballot FE due to collinearity. The numbers in parentheses show the standard
errors, clustered at the municipal level. In all specifications, population weights are applied to account
for the fact, that municipalities differ in their size. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.7: DiD estimates: Effect of lunchtime and after-school care on vote outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Provision 1.58*** 1.27** 1.08* 0.82
(0.556) (0.599) (0.550) (0.554)
Regulation -8.71*** -7.89*** -5.77***
(0.457) (0.500) (0.954)
Tax multiplier -0.01* -0.00 0.03**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.015)
Voter turnout -0.27*** -0.16*** -0.26*** -0.26***
(0.035) (0.029) (0.040) (0.037)
Births in % of pop -0.25*** -0.14** -0.21*** -0.26***
(0.069) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067)
Immigrants in % of pop 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.09***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Emigrants in % of pop -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.05** -0.04*
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ballot FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inc. tax No No Yes No
Canton x ballot FE No No No Yes
Number of mun. 915 742 915 915
Number of obs. 3658 2966 3658 3658
Notes: This table presents the DiD estimates, γˆ1 and γˆ2, of Equation (1). The regulation coefficient
shows the differential change in vote outcomes of municipalities in cantons with regulation compared to
municipalities in cantons without regulation regarding lunchtime and after-school care in public schools,
controlling for the differences in provision within the treated cantons. The provision coefficient estimates
the differential change in vote outcomes in municipalities which introduce lunchtime and after-school
care as a consequence of the new regulation compared to those which do not. Inc. tax consists of the
income tax (cantonal + municipality + church taxes) for singles, married couples with no children, and
married couples with two children, each for yearly net incomes of CHF 80,000.-, 100,000.-, 150,000.-, and
200,000.-. In specification (4), Canton × municipality FE are applied, and the Regulation coefficient can
no longer be identified due to collinearity. In all specifications, population weights are applied to account
for the fact that municipalities differ in their population. The numbers in parentheses show the standard
errors, clustered at the municipal level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Descriptives for municipalities in the canton of Bern
Table A.9: Descriptive statistics for municipalities with the canton of Bern only
Mat. Leave I Mat. Leave II Family Policy Family Init.
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
No Provision
Share of Yes votes 29.06 (12.55) 44.51 (11.59) 38.74 (11.65) 44.48 (8.75)
Tax multiplier 2.59 (0.23) 1.80 (0.22) 1.73 (0.20) 1.73 (0.20)
Share of SPP voters 46.63 (13.34) 46.37 (12.81) 43.42 (11.19) 43.42 (11.19)
Share of SP voters 19.24 (8.43) 18.93 (8.26) 12.23 (5.83) 12.23 (5.83)
Voter turnout 45.47 (8.33) 48.74 (7.19) 42.36 (6.28) 54.92 (10.89)
Births in % of pop 1.08 (0.47) 4.80 (1.23) 12.95 (2.78) 12.95 (2.78)
Deaths in % of pop 1.00 (0.56) 4.50 (1.27) 12.49 (3.13) 12.49 (3.13)
Immigrants in % of pop 6.16 (2.63) 30.74 (8.94) 88.26 (20.38) 88.26 (20.38)
Emigrants in % of pop 6.35 (2.34) 30.43 (7.87) 87.55 (19.76) 87.55 (19.76)
Population in 1000 0.87 (0.85) 0.88 (0.85) 0.90 (0.87) 0.90 (0.87)
Number of Mun. 200 200 199 199
Cost > Median
Share of Yes votes 33.19 (11.30) 51.88 (11.22) 44.07 (11.25) 51.47 (9.07)
Tax multiplier 2.44 (0.28) 1.71 (0.23) 1.63 (0.21) 1.63 (0.21)
Share of SPP voters 35.29 (14.67) 35.71 (13.74) 33.88 (11.01) 33.88 (11.01)
Share of SP voters 23.17 (7.40) 23.82 (7.76) 16.04 (5.84) 16.04 (5.84)
Voter turnout 46.99 (5.75) 51.58 (5.61) 43.13 (5.23) 54.57 (8.67)
Births in % of pop 1.02 (0.28) 4.57 (0.97) 11.92 (2.45) 11.92 (2.45)
Deaths in % of pop 0.89 (0.35) 4.24 (1.05) 11.20 (3.08) 11.20 (3.08)
Immigrants in % of pop 6.31 (1.45) 33.21 (6.25) 90.15 (18.42) 90.15 (18.42)
Emigrants in % of pop 6.46 (1.61) 31.42 (5.59) 83.35 (16.70) 83.35 (16.70)
Population in 1000 2.85 (2.48) 2.91 (2.53) 3.10 (2.67) 3.10 (2.67)
Number of Mun. 57 57 57 57
Cost ≤ Median
Share of Yes votes 30.35 (7.68) 48.89 (8.18) 42.96 (8.04) 50.57 (7.00)
Tax multiplier 2.56 (0.19) 1.77 (0.19) 1.68 (0.18) 1.68 (0.18)
Share of SPP voters 35.09 (9.69) 35.85 (8.87) 35.18 (7.42) 35.18 (7.42)
Share of SP voters 24.54 (6.23) 25.66 (6.22) 16.23 (5.19) 16.23 (5.19)
Voter turnout 45.37 (5.03) 49.79 (4.95) 42.03 (5.35) 51.85 (7.01)
Births in % of pop 1.03 (0.25) 4.71 (0.71) 12.05 (2.16) 12.05 (2.16)
Deaths in % of pop 0.95 (0.28) 4.53 (1.04) 11.70 (2.95) 11.70 (2.95)
Immigrants in % of pop 7.04 (2.45) 34.71 (9.52) 94.36 (20.86) 94.36 (20.86)
Emigrants in % of pop 6.89 (2.89) 32.76 (8.85) 87.94 (19.90) 87.94 (19.90)
Population in 1000 3.78 (6.48) 3.84 (6.47) 4.08 (7.03) 4.08 (7.03)
Number of Mun. 58 58 58 58
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for municipalities in the canton of Bern included in the
analyses. It distinguishes between municipalities with no provision, municipalities with provision and
costs above median costs, and municipalities with provision and costs smaller or equal to median costs.
Here, costs refer to per capita costs of lunchtime and after-school care after parental contributions and
after redistribution between municipalities.
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